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Intended Use In Products Liability
Parks v. Simpson Timber Co.1

Plaintiff was a longshoreman employed by an independent stevedore to load cargo in the hold of a vessel owned by the defendant
carrier. As cargo was loaded through the hatch, plaintiff moved it
away from the hatch to other parts of the hold, using cargo previously
loaded as a floor on which to walk. Plaintiff had loaded a bundle of
doors being shipped by defendant manufacturer into the hold, and had
moved them away from the hatch. Each door in the package had a large
aperture into which glass could later be inserted. When the doors
were stacked on top of each other, the aligned apertures formed a
well 42 inches high. Around the center of the bundle of doors, the
manufacturer had wrapped corrugated cardboard; and, although it left
both ends of the package exposed, the cardboard effectively covered the
entire well created by the empty window frames in the doors. After
plaintiff had loaded this package in the hold, he took from the hatch
a heavy sack of flour, shouldered it, and began to move across the floor
created by the previously loaded cargo. When he stepped on the corrugated cardboard covering the package of doors, he broke through the
cardboard, fell into the well created by the window frames, and sustained serious injuries.
Plaintiff sued both the carrier and manufacturer of the doors.
The jury returned a verdict against both defendants, and the verdict
was initially affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in a 2-1 decision.2 However, the court granted a
petition for rehearing en banc; and, on November 9, 1966, the full court
reversed the three-judge panel, with four judges dissenting.'
1.
2.
3.
Oregon

369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966).
Parks v. Simpson Timber Co., No. 19,673, 9th Cir., Dec. 3, 1965.
369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966). This case was removed from a state court of
to the United States District Court where jurisdiction rested on diversity of
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The plaintiff based his action against the manufacturer on a theory
of negligence, rather than on warranty or strict liability. The trial
judge had given an instruction which permitted the jury to find that
the manufacturer was negligent if it found that the manufacturer either
knew "or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known" that
longshoremen, such as the plaintiff, might walk on the packaged doors.4
The Court of Appeals agreed that, if the manufacturer in fact knew
of a practice among longshoremen of walking upon cargo, it would be
liable for negligence in breaching a duty -to the longshoremen. 5 But
an instruction that the manufacturer would be liable if he reasonably
should have known of the longshoremen's practice would impose upon
the manufacturer "the legal duty to make inquiry as to the working
practice of those who might handle its product."' The court refused
to create such a duty on the ground that it would not be "fair" to
require the manufacturer "to anticipate every course which the product
is to follow and to acquire knowledge, in advance, as to the uses to
which his product will be subjected by reason of working practices,
perhaps unique, or even strange, of those who are to handle it."7 The
dissent reasoned, first, that it is not necessary to require the manufacturer to -foresee "every" use to which his product will be put, but only
those which the manufacturer, in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have anticipated ;8 and, second, that the manufacturer, under the facts
of the case, could have reasonably anticipated that the bundle of doors
would be walked on by longshoremen in the course of shipment.'
Originally, negligence liability was extended only to persons in
privity with the manufacturer.' 0 Later, the requirement of privity was
overlooked in cases such as poisons and other "inherently dangerous"
or "imminently dangerous" products." Today, liability has been imposed upon the manufacturer where the injured party was not in privity
with the manufacturer in a wide variety of situations.'" The general
rule, however, is that recovery is denied unless the injured party was
using the product or was in the vicinity of someone using the product
in the manner for which it was designed and manufactured."3 Such
use has become known as the "intended use" of the product, 4 a notion
which would seem to be a necessary corollary of the concept of negligence as doing something which will foreseeably cause harm.
On the facts of the instant case, determining whether a manufacturer will be liable to an employee of a carrier for injuries sustained
citizenship and the necessary amount in controversy. In neither of its opinions, however, did the United States Court of Appeals purport to be applying the substantive
state law of Oregon.
4. Id. at 327.
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at 328.
7. Id. at 330.

8. Id. at 333.

9. Id. at 336.

10. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
11. See, e.g., Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870)
(explosives) ; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (poison).
12. See generally PaossER, TORTS § 96, at 662-63 (3d ed. 1964).
13. Id. at 667-68.
14. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVII

by the employee while handling the manufacturer's product involves
essentially two questions: First, does a manufacturer owe a duty to a
plaintiff who has assisted in the movement through commerce of
the manufacturer's product? This is the "remote plaintiff" problem.
Second, can a plaintiff recover for injuries from the manufacturer of
a product which the plaintiff was using for a purpose accepted as
customary in the plaintiff's trade or business, but which was not the
purpose for which the product was manufactured? This is the "intended
use" problem.
I.

THE REMOTE

PLAINTIFF

The problem of the "remote plaintiff," or the plaintiff who is not
in privity with the manufacturer of the product, has been in large
measure resolved in this country. Its evolution since MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.' 5 is well known, and ably recounted elsewhere. 6
Essentially, the MacPherson case held that a manufacturer is liable for
injuries caused by a product whose "nature . . . is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made .... ,,17 Courts throughout the United States have accepted
the MacPhersondecision as establishing a manufacturer's liability for
negligently producing an item which causes injury to a person, or to
someone in the vicinity of a person, lawfully using the product for a
purpose for which it was manufactured.'i In Maryland, although the
status of the MacPherson rule was unclear for many years, 19 it now
appears to have been accepted.2 °
Having abandoned the requirement of "imminent" or "inherent"
danger, the courts since MacPherson have held manufacturers liable
for injuries arising from such ostensibly inert and innocuous products
as a hair comb, 2' an evening dress,22 twine, 23 a sofa bed 4 (but not a
15. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
16. PROSSER, TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964) ; Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).

17. 111 N.E. at 1053.

18. See, e.g., Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481
(1934) ; Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934) ; Carter v.
Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 164 A.L.R. 559 (1946) ; Sicard v. Kremer,
133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938) ; Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Wallace,
69 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). Each of these cases is believed to be the
earliest decision to accept the MacPherson holding in its jurisdiction. For decisions,
not necessarily the earliest, in other jurisdictions, see 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 5.03[1], 17 (1960).
19. See Walker v. Vail, 203 Md. 321, 101 A.2d 201 (1953) ("qualified recognition") ; Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, 198 Md. 585, 84 A.2d 876 (1951) ("never ...
expressly approved or disapproved").
20. See Woodzell v. Garzell Plastics Industries, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Mich. 1957) (applying Maryland law) ; Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220
Md. 200, 203, 151 A.2d 731, 733 (1959) (however, no liability imposed in this case
because the caustic qualities of concrete are "obvious" to a reasonable man) ; Babylon
v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 303, 138 A.2d 375, 377 (1958) (liability imposed upon manufacturer of a concrete slab which broke when plaintiff stepped on it).
21. Smith v. S. S. Kresge Co., 79 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1935).
22. Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944),
aff'd, 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E.2d 839 (1945).
23. Schuylerville Wall Paper Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 272 App. Div. 856, 70
N.Y.S.2d 166 (1947), appeal denied, 272 App. Div. 980, 73 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1947).
24. Simmons v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App. 420, 43 S.E.2d 553 (1947).
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fixed-position bed25 ), and a bottle of perfume. 26 Thus, the courts have
almost completely eliminated privity of contract as a necessary element
in establishing negligence liability.27 The plaintiff in MacPherson,
although not in privity with the manufacturer, was at least a purchaser.
Successful plaintiffs in cases subsequent to MacPherson have included
employees of the purchaser, 28 members of his family, 2 a donee of the
purchaser,3 0 a prospective purchaser, 3 ' and an independent contractor
of a subsequent purchaser. 2 Products liability has even been extended
to non-users, such as casual bystanders,33 who have been in the vicinity
of the user.34 It is entirely logical to apply this doctrine so as to recognize a duty owed by the manufacturer of a product to those handling
it during shipment.
Instead of focusing on the contractual ties, if any, between the
parties, courts today frequently seem to speak in terms of social and
economic relations, and especially of the benefit which a manufacturer
may derive from the plaintiff's contact with the product.3" Often, the
purchaser of a product will intend that it be used by someone else. For
instance, an employer may buy a product for use by an employee ;"6
a parent for a child ;37 or, a purchaser for resale to another, as in those
everyday situations where the original purchaser is a wholesaler dealer,
who is less likely than anyone to use the product himself. 8 In such
cases, the manufacturer clearly benefits from the ultimate user's contact with the product, since the original purchaser would not have
bought the product except for the existence of the ultimate user. At
the essence of the benefit theory, therefore, are the utility and marketability of the product, which outweigh the risk of injury resulting from
its use. The benefit theory has even been extended, quite reasonably,
to a teacher who was a donee from the manufacturer of laboratory
materials for classroom use.3 9 If the ultimate user, even though he is
not the immediate purchaser, benefits the manufacturer, so also does a
longshoreman who assists in moving a product through commerce
toward the manufacturer's vendee. Without such assistance, the manufacturer would be compelled to devise his own network of transportation or to -require his purchasers to accept delivery only at his plant.
Therefore, the assistance of persons such as the plaintiff in the instant
25. Jaroniec v. C. 0. Hasselbarth, Inc., 223 App. Div. 182, 228 N.Y.S. 302 (1928).
26. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 67 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
27. Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D. Ark. 1950);
Howell v. Betts, 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924, 925 (1962) (dicta).
28. See Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956) ; Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement
Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956); Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932).
29. See, e.g., Baker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
30. See Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1940).
31. See Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
32. See Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415 (1936).
33. See, e.g., McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122
(1927).
34. RSSTAT4MENT (SFcoND), TORTS § 395, comment i (1965).
35. See Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1939).
36. See note 21 supra.
37. See note 22 supra.
38. Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951).
39. Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939).
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case enables manufacturers to carry on business throughout far greater
areas than would otherwise be possible.
A manufacturer owes his own employees a duty to avoid negligence in manufacturing the product. He owes the same duty of care,
as we have seen, not only to persons with whom he is in privity, but
also "to remote and unknown persons,""' as long as they are reasonably
foreseeable. There is, therefore, no reason why a manufacturer's duty to
those who handle or use his product should be suspended from the time
when the product leaves his factory until it reaches the first purchaser.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Tierney,4 defendant shipped a quantity of
naptha, negligently labelled as carbon oil, by railroad. Plaintiff, an
employee of the railroad, was injured when naptha which had leaked
from its container exploded. The court found that the manufacturer
owed a duty to those employees of the railroad who handled the product
in transit.
As suggested above, a purchaser of a product often buys it having
in mind an ultimate user other than himself. In such a situation, the
user, because of his need for and contact with the product, confers an
economic benefit upon the manufacturer. This benefit is less clear,
however, when the ultimate user is someone whom the purchaser
probably did not have in mind when he bought the product, such as an
innocent bystander4 2 or a donee of the purchaser.43 Cases allowing
recovery to remote plaintiffs of this ilk usually rationalize their holdings
on special grounds, such as a high duty of care owed to the particular
plaintiff,4 4 or, especially in earlier cases, an "imminently" or "inher45
ently" dangerous product.

The courts have also, in cases involving plaintiffs of varying
degrees of remoteness, imposed liability on the basis of "a duty imposed by the law upon one who may foresee that his actions or failure
to act may result in an injury to others.

' 46

In other words, negligence

liability to the remote plaintiff has been based on the element of foreseeability. Since the Palsgrafcase, 47 a debate has raged in judicial and
academic circles as to whether foreseeability of injury to the particular
plaintiff (Judge Cardozo's position 48 ) or mere foreseeability of injury
to anyone (Judge Andrews' position49 ) is necessary to support recovery. Even under the more limited Cardozo view, a manufacturer
who ships substantial quantities of his product by vessel should reasonably foresee that longshoremen will necessarily come into contact
40. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769, 779 (1964)
(employee of defendant's purchaser) ; Garrett v. S. N. Nielsen Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d 422,
200 N.E.2d 81, 86 (1964) (employee of defendant's subcontractor).
41. 92 Ky. 367, 17 S.W. 1025 (1891).
42. See McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927).
43. See Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1940).
44. See, e.g., Carpini v. Pittsburgh and Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404, 405
(3d Cir. 1954).
45. See, e.g., Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855, 857 (1928).
46. Gaidry Motors v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. 1953). See also Ford
Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1959) ; Nelson v. Union Wire Rope
Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769, 779 (1964).
47. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, Inc., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R.
1253 (1928).
48. 162 N.E. at 100.
49. Id. at 102.
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with his product. The manufacturer may never see the purchaser or
subsequent users; but where, as in the instant case, he delivers his
goods directly to the dock, he may well confront the carrier, the stevedore, and their employees personally.
II. INTENDED USE

The idea that a manufacturer is liable for an injury caused by his
product when it is being put to a use for which it was manufactured
is no more than an attempt to define the usual situation in which courts
will impose liability. In such cases, liability is based on the ground
that the manufacturer should have reasonably been able to foresee an
injury caused by a product with which he is expected to be familiar.
Thus, the intended use doctrine is merely a refinement of the reasonable
foreseeability test50 which more precisely describes a frequently recurring
factual situation.
When a manufacturer places a product on the market, he will
usually have in mind at least one purpose for it. It is only logical to
charge the manufacturer with liability for a negligent act or omission
by him which causes injury while the product is being used for this
purpose. 51 Over the course of time, however, users of a product may
discover uses for it which the manufacturer did not originally have
in mind and never intended. The "ordinary" use of a product, 52 or

the use which the manufacturer intended for it, may not be the only
purpose for which the product may be employed. The manufacturer
benefits from these additional uses since they enhance the utility of the
product and, thus, its value to at least some purchasers. Therefore,
as the majority in the instant case recognizes, if the manufacturer
becomes aware that his product is being used for a new or additional
purpose, he should be liable for negligent acts or omissions on his part
which cause injury while the product is being used in this additional
capacity.5 3 Likewise, even where the manufacturer does not in fact
know of the new use, if from the surrounding circumstances he reason54
ably should have known of it, he should still be charged with liability.

For example, in Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc.,55 the
plaintiff was injured when she fell from an aluminum chair on which
she had been standing. The court acknowledged that the "ordinary
use" of a chair is for sitting, but held that the manufacturer could have
"reasonably anticipated that the described chairs would be used for
50. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 395 (1965) ; HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW

oF TORTS § 28.6 (1956).
52. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857,

859 (1951).
53. Parks v. Simpson Timber Co., 369 F.2d 324, 327-28 (9th Cir. 1966).
54. Cf. 66 COLUM. L. R~v. 1190, 1193 (1966). Requiring the manufacturer to
know the nature of his product induces him to make it safe. If a manufacturer's
liability were based only on what he actually knew, he would be encouraged to avoid
liability by remaining ignorant. Thus, in Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415, 135 Atl.
20 (1926), the court stated that "where a duty to use care is imposed and knowledge
is necessary to careful conduct, voluntary ignorance is equivalent to negligence." 135
Ati. at 22.
55. 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951).
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the purpose of standing upon them."
Thus, a manufacturer should
be liable for injury arising from an unintended use if it is reasonably
foreseeable. 7
"Intended use" is, therefore, as the dissent in the instant case
suggests, only " 'a convenient adaptation of the basic test of "reasonably foreseeability" .
. . ).'" Whatever appellation is used - intended
use, reasonable anticipation, 9 or foreseeability6 ° - the basic question
presented in the context of the Simpson case is whether a jury could
rationally conclude that the manufacturer should have foreseen that
persons engaged in moving his product through commerce would use
it for a purpose other than that for which a purchaser would buy it but
entirely in accordance with the trade customs of shipping goods. The
answer should be an unequivocal "Yes." The law imposes a duty upon
a manufacturer who knows that his "affirmative conduct" in producing and distributing a product will necessarily affect the interests of
other persons."'
The manufacturer's purchaser and those taking subsequent to
him will generally purchase or use the product for the same purpose,
whereas those who come into contact with the product prior to the
purchaser - that is, while the product is still in transit - may use or
handle it in a different manner. The most important question, however, is not whether the injured party is prior or subsequent to the
first purchaser, but whether the use from which the injury arose was
foreseeable to the manufacturer. Therefore, if the manufacturer should
be liable to the purchaser, or to someone taking the product after the
purchaser, for a use other than that for which the product is usually
sold, but one which the manufacturer should have foreseen, 62 then he
should also be liable for an unintended but foreseeable use by an injured
party who comes into contact with the product before the purchaser.
Common practice among those who the manufacturer knows will
come into contact with the product will assist in establishing what uses
should 'be reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer.63 Thus, custom
in the trade is evidence of a "proper" use. 4 A manufacturer is not,
however, expected to know of every trade custom among persons who
will come into contact with his product, but only those which are
sufficiently "general" in the trade.6 5 It was established in the instant
case that using previously loaded cargo as a floor was a custom of the
56. 235 P.2d at 859-60. See also Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220,
167 S.E. 306, 308 (1932).
57. RESTATEMENT (SVcoND), TORTS § 395, comment k (1965).
58. Parks v. Simpson Timber Co., 369 F.2d 324, 334 (9th Cir. 1966). See also
Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962).
59. See McCready v. United Iron and Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir.
1959) ; Pierce v. C. H. Bidwell Thresher Co., 153 Mich. 323, 116 N.W. 1104, 1105
(1908).
60. See Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1963); Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence in Design or Directions for Use of Product, 71 YALn L.J.
816, 856 (1962).
61. PROSSER, TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
62. See, e.g., Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Phillips
v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857, 859 (1951).
63. See McCready v. United Iron and Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir.
1959).
64. See Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Mo. 1958).
65. McCready v. United Iron and Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1959).
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longshoring trade. Moreover, the "practice was not unusual or peculiar,
but was pervasive and long continued," 6 and known by other manufacturers exporting from the same port.0 7 Even if the manufacturer
was unaware of this custom, he should have been able to anticipate the
use. While the "zone" of possible injuries from any product is "practically limitless," the "zone of the probable . . . is very much narrower . . . and a 'survey of it involves the exercise of reasonable foresight."6 Here, the manufacturer shipped 16,000 to 18,000 doors each
year by cargo vessels. The doors were delivered directly to the dock
for loading. Unlike some cases in which recovery has been denied, 9
the manufacturer came into direct contact with the stevedore and with
the stevedore's employees. A single inspection of one of the cargo
vessels would have provided the manufacturer with useful information
about the manner in which his product was shipped and handled during an ocean voyage, about which a jury might rationally conclude that
the manufacturer should have been curious as a matter of course.
The manufacturer could also have protected himself from liability
by warning of the trap disguised by the cardboard covering. Where
a manufacturer can easily and inexpensively warn of a latent danger,
it is unreasonable for him not to do so.7" It is for the jury to decide
whether a plaintiff's use of the product is reasonably foreseeable and
whether the defendant's failure to warn of the danger in such use constitutes negligence. 71 However, even if there is no negligence in the
manufacture of !the product, the jury may find that it was negligent
not to warn a prospective user - not in privity with the manufacturer - of a potential danger of which the manufacturer was cognizant. 72 There was sufficient evidence presented that manufacturers
of fragile or breakable products marked them as such, and that the
longshoremen took the necessary precautions in accordance with products so marked.
It is entirely natural from a business viewpoint that a manufacturer should want to -inform himself about the handling of his product
during shipment to his purchasers; and a jury could fairly conclude
that a manufacturer should have reasonably anticipated or foreseen
actions of others which natural business curiosity would have apprised
him of immediately. Where these actions, when performed in relation
to a .manufacturer's product, would possibly cause serious injury, yet
would probably not be performed if the actor were cognizant of the
danger, it is not an inordinate onus to require the manufacturer to
underscore and probably eliminate this danger with a simple warning
affixed to the product.
66. Parks v. Simpson Timber Co., 369 F.2d 324, 332 (9th Cir. 1966). See also
Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958).
67. Parks v. Simpson Timber Co., 369 F.2d 324, 333 (1966).
68. Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
69. McCready v. United Iron and Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959);
Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958).
70. Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1939).
71. Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1963). See also
Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848, 853 (1952).
72. Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 469, 403
P.2d 351, 355 (1965).

